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This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining prob-
lems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the
three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems:
the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash’s
original axioms.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper considers nonconvex bargaining problems for n players. Speciﬁ-
cally, we study (normalized) bargaining problems that are compact and com-
prehensive, but are not necessarily convex. Nonconvex bargaining problems
can arise in many economic contexts when, for example, individuals are non-
expected utility maximizers. They also arise naturally in bargaining prob-
lems when individuals are not characterized by their utilities but by their
capability sets ` al aSen (1985) (see Xu and Yoshihara (2004) for such cases).
The literature has some discussions on nonconvex bargaining problems.
For example, there exists a number of characterizations of the Nash bargain-
ing solution for the class of compact and comprehensive bargaining problems.
However, in all the characterization results, either a type of continuity prop-
erty is imposed (see, for example, Kaneko (1980), Herrero (1989), Conley and
Wilkie (1996)), or the class of bargaining problems contains ﬁnite bargaining
problems in addition to those that are compact and comprehensive (see, for
example, Mariotti (1999)). The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we
give a new characterization of the Nash bargaining solution for the class of
compact and comprehensive bargaining problems by four axioms: Eﬃciency,
Symmetry, Scale Invariance and Contraction Independence, and provide a
simple proof that highlights the crucial role that Contraction Independence
plays. Because of our proof method, it is interesting to note that we do
not use any continuity type axiom in our characterization. The four axioms
used in the characterization result of the Nash solution are natural exten-
sions of Nash’s original four axioms (Nash (1950)) in our context. Viewed
in this way, this characterization result reported in the paper is perhaps
closer to Nash’s original program than those already existing in the litera-
ture. Secondly, we use variants of the four axioms used for characterizing
the Nash solution to characterize the egalitarian solution (Kalai (1977)) and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)) for noncon-
vex bargaining problems. Our characterization results of the egalitarian and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions again highlights the crucial role that Con-
traction Independence or Weak Contraction Independence (see Section 3 for
the formal deﬁnition) plays. It should be noted that our characterizations
of the egalitarian as well as the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions do not use the
commonly used Monotonicity type axioms for characterizations of those two
solutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay
2down some basic notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 presents our axioms and
their discussions. The main results and their proofs are contained in Section
4. We conclude the paper with a few remarks in Section 5 comparing and
contrasting the axioms used in characterizing the three solutions.
2N o t a t i o n a n d D e ﬁnitions
R+ is the set of all non-negative real numbers and R++ is the set of all
positive numbers. Rn
+ (resp. Rn
++)i st h en-fold Cartesian product of R+
(resp. R++). For any x,y ∈ Rn
+, we write x>yto mean [xi ≥ yi for all
i ∈ N and x 6 =y], and x À y to mean [xi >y i for all i ∈ N]. For any
x ∈ Rn
+ and any non-negative number α,w ew r i t ez =( α;x−i) ∈ Rn
+ to
mean that zi = α and zj = xj for all j ∈ N \{i}.As u b s e tA ⊆ Rn
+ is said to
be non-trivial if there exists a ∈ A such that a À 0. Let Σ be the set of all
non-trivial, compact and comprehensive subsets of Rn
+.E l e m e n t s i n Σ are
interpreted as (normalized) bargaining problems. A bargaining solution F
assigns a nonempty subset F(A)o fA for every bargaining problem A ∈ Σ.
Let π be a permutation of N. The set of all permutations of N is denoted
by Π. For all x =( xi)i∈N ∈ Rn
+,l e tπ(x)=( xπ(i))i∈N.F o r a l l A ∈ Σ and
any permutation π ∈ Π,l e tπ(A)={π(a):a ∈ A}.F o ra n yA ∈ Σ,w es a y
that A is symmetric if A = π(A)f o ra l lπ ∈ Π.
For all A ∈ Σ and all i ∈ N,l e tmi(A)=m a x {ai :( a1,···,a i,···,a n) ∈
A}.T h e r e f o r e ,m(A) ≡ (mi(A))i∈N is the ideal point of A. For all A ⊆ Rn
+,





+ : z ≤ x for some x ∈ A
ª
.
Deﬁnition 1: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the Nash solution if for all




i∈N xi for all x ∈ A}.
Deﬁnition 2: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the egalitarian solution if
for all A ∈ Σ, F(A)={a ∈ A : ai = aj for all i,j ∈ N and there is no x ∈ A
such that x> >a }.
Deﬁnition 3: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution if for all A ∈ Σ, F(A)={a ∈ A : mi(A)/ai = mj(A)/aj for all
i,j ∈ N and there is no x ∈ A such that x> >a }.
3Our notion of the Nash solution for nonconvex bargaining problems is
identical to the one proposed by Kaneko (1980).1 It should be noted that,
given that Σ contains all non-trivial, compact and comprehensive bargaining
problems, for any A ∈ Σ, the Nash solution F(A) can contain more than one
alternative, while both the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions
are singletons.
3A x i o m s
In this section, we present our axioms that are to be used for characteriza-
tion results. We start with two eﬃciency type axioms which are commonly
invoked in the literature.
Eﬃciency (E): For any A ∈ Σ and any a ∈ F(A), there is no x ∈ A such
that x>a .
Weak Eﬃciency (WE): For any A ∈ Σ and any a ∈ F(A), there is no
x ∈ A such that x À a.
The next two axioms are natural generalizations of Nash’s original sym-
metry axiom in our context.
Symmetry (S): For any A ∈ Σ,i fA is symmetric, then [a ∈ F(A) ⇒
π(a) ∈ F(A)].
Strong Symmetry (SS): For any A ∈ Σ,i fA is symmetric, then [a ∈
F(A) ⇒ ai = aπ(i) for all i ∈ N].
Symmetry is a natural generalization of Nash’s original symmetry axiom
to nonconvex problems and is also discussed in Mariotti (1999). Strong
Symmetry is a stronger requirement than Symmetry. It should be noted that,
when restricted to convex bargaining problems, and bargaining solutions are
1Mariotti (1999) also discusses axiomatic characterization of the Kaneko type of the
Nash solution for nonconvex problems, although his domain is larger than ours in the
sense that it includes “ﬁnite bargaining problems.” In contrast, Herrero’s proposal (Herrero
(1989)) for the Nash extension solution constitutes a superset of the set of the Kaneko type
solution outcomes on each nonconvex problem, and Conley and Wilkie (1996) proposes an
extension of the Nash solution which is a single-valued mapping in that domain.
4required to be single-valued mappings, the two symmetry axioms coincide
with and are identical to Nash’s original Symmetry axiom.
The next axiom is the familiar scale invariance property commonly used
in both convex (see, for example, Nash (1950)) and nonconvex bargaining
problems (see, for example, Conley and Wilkie (1996), Herrero (1989), Mar-
iotti (1999).
Scale Invariance (SI): For all A ∈ Σ and all α ∈ Rn
++,i fαA = {(αiai)i∈N :
a ∈ A} then F(αA)={(αiai)i∈N : a ∈ F(A)}.
The ﬁnal two axioms are extensions of Nash’s original Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives.
Contraction Independence (CI): For any A,B ∈ Σ,i fB ⊆ A and B ∩
F(A) 6 =∅,t h e nF(B)=B ∩ F(A).
Weak Contraction Independence (WCI): For any A,B ∈ Σ,i fm(A)=
m(B), B ⊆ A and B ∩ F(A) 6 =∅,t h e nF(B)=B ∩ F(A).
Contraction Independence has been widely used in the literature of non-
convex bargaining problems. Weak Contraction Independence is new and
is weaker than Contraction Independence: it restricts contractions to those
problems that have the same ideal point.
4 Extensions of the classical bargaining solu-
tions and their characterizations
In this section, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Nash solution,
the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Theorem 1: A bargaining solution F over Σ i st h eN a s hs o l u t i o ni fa n d
only if it satisﬁes Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Invariance and Contraction
Independence.
Proof. It can be checked that if F i st h eN a s hs o l u t i o no v e rΣ then it
satisﬁes the four axioms in Theorem 1. Thus, we need only to show that if a
bargaining solution F over Σ satisﬁes Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Invariance
and Contraction Independence, then it must be the Nash solution.
5Let F over Σ satisfy the above four axioms. Given any bargaining problem
A ∈ Σ,w eﬁrst show that
Claim 1: for any x and a which are both eﬃcient in A,a n di f




i∈N ai,t h e nx 6 ∈F(A).
Let a,x ∈ A be such that they are eﬃcient in A and that
Q
i∈N xi < Q
i∈N ai. Suppose to the contrary that
x ∈ F(A).
Consider the bargaining problem B =c o m p {x,a}. From the construction,
B ⊆ A. By Contraction Independence,
x ∈ F(B).
Let z ∈ Rn
+ be (z1;x−1) ∈ Rn









i∈N ai,w em u s th a v ez1 >x 1. Consider the bargaining
problem C ∈ Σ,w h i c hi sd e ﬁned as:
C =c o m p {a,z}.
Clearly, B ⊆ C.B yc h o o s i n gα ∈ Rn
++ appropriately, given that z1
Qn
i=2 xi = Q
i∈N ai,w ec a nh a v e( αizi)i∈N = π0((αiai)i∈N)a n d( αiai)i∈N = π0((αizi)i∈N)
for some permutation π0 ∈ Π.L e t D = {y ∈ Rn
+ : y =( αibi)i∈N for all
b ∈ C}.N o t et h a ta and z are the two and only two eﬃcient points in C.I t
then follows that (αiai)i∈N and (αizi)i∈N are the two and only two eﬃcient
points in D. Construct the following bargaining problem G ∈ Σ:
G ≡∪ π∈Ππ(D).
Clearly, G is symmetric. By Symmetry and Eﬃciency, it must be true that
{(αiai)i∈N,(αizi)i∈N} ⊆ F(G).




6Noting that B ⊆ C, by Contraction Independence, it follows that
{a} = F(B)
a contradiction. Therefore, x 6 ∈F(A). Claim 1 is thus proved. Therefore,
we must have the following:






xi ∀x ∈ A}.
It remains to show that for any A ∈ Σ,f o ra l lz ∈ {a ∈ A :
Q
i∈N ai ≥ Q
i∈N xi ∀x ∈ A},i tm u s tb et r u et h a tz ∈ F(A). Given that F(A)i sn o t
empty, from the above, let a ∈ F(A). Then, a must be such that
Q
i∈N ai ≥ Q
i∈N xi for all x ∈ A. Suppose there exists y ∈ A such that
Q
i∈N yi = Q
i∈N ai and yet y 6 ∈F(A). Consider the following bargaining problem:
X ≡ comp{a,y}.N o t e t h a t X ⊆ A.S i n c e a ∈ F(A)a n dy 6 ∈F(A),
by Contraction Independence, we must have a ∈ F(X)a n dy 6 ∈F(X).
By appropriately choosing α ∈ Rn





can have π0((αiai)i∈N)=( αiyi)i∈N and π0((αiyi)i∈N)=( αiai)i∈N for some
permutation π0 over N.C o n s i d e rX0 ≡ {(αixi)i∈N :( xi)i∈N ∈ X}.B yS c a l e
Invariance,
(αiai)i∈N ∈ F(X
0)a n d( αiyi)i∈N 6 ∈F(X
0).
Now, construct the bargaining problem Z ≡∪ π∈Ππ(X0). Clearly, Z is sym-
metric and X0 ⊆ Z. By Symmetry and Eﬃciency, it must be true that
{(αiai)i∈N,(αiyi)i∈N} ⊆ F(Z).
Noting that X0 ⊆ Z, by Contraction Independence, it follows that
{(αiai)i∈N,(αiyi)i∈N} = F(X
0).
Scale Invariance now implies that
{a,y} = F(X),
a contradiction. Therefore, y ∈ F(A) .T h a ti s ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a t






xi ∀x ∈ A} ⊆ F(A).
7Therefore,






xi ∀x ∈ A}.
¦
Theorem 2: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the egalitarian solution if
and only if it satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Strong Symmetry and Contraction
Independence.
Proof. It can be checked that if F is the egalitarian solution over Σ then it
satisﬁes the four axioms in Theorem 2. Thus, we need only to show that if
a bargaining solution F over Σ satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Strong Symmetry
and Contraction Independence, then it must be the egalitarian solution.
Let F over Σ satisfy the above three axioms. Given any bargaining prob-
lem A ∈ Σ,w eﬁrst show that
Claim 2: for any x and a which are weakly eﬃcient in A,a n di f
x,a ∈ A is such that [xi 6 =xj for some i,j ∈ N], and [ai = aj for
all i,j ∈ N], then x 6 ∈F(A).
Let a,x ∈ A be such that they are weakly eﬃcient and that [xi 6 =xj for
some i,j ∈ N], and [ai = aj for all i,j ∈ N]. Suppose to the contrary that
x ∈ F(A).
Consider the bargaining problem
B =c o m p {a,x}.
Note that B ⊆ A. By Contraction Independence,
x ∈ F(B).
Consider the bargaining problem C ∈ Σ,w h i c hi sd e ﬁned below:
C = ∪π∈Ππ(B).
By construction, C is symmetric, a ∈ C, a is weakly eﬃcient in C,a n d
B ⊆ C. By Strong Symmetry and Weak Eﬃciency, it then follows that
8F(C)={a}.N o t i n gt h a tB ⊆ C, by Contraction Independence, it follows
that
F(B)={a}
a contraction with x ∈ F(B). Therefore, x 6 ∈F(A). Then, by Weak Eﬃ-
ciency, it must be true that
F(A)={a ∈ A : ai = aj ∀i ∈ N and there exists no x ∈ A such that x> >a }.
¦
Theorem 3: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution if and only if it satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Strong Symmetry, Scale
Invariance and Weak Contraction Independence.
Proof. It can be checked that if F is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution over
Σ then it satisﬁes the four axioms in Theorem 3. Thus, we need only to
show that if a bargaining solution F over Σ satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Strong
Symmetry, Scale Invariance and Weak Contraction Independence, then it
must be the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Let F over Σ satisfy the above four axioms. Given any bargaining problem
A ∈ Σ, by Scale Invariance, without loss of generality, we take that [mi(A)=
mj(A)f o ra l li,j ∈ N]. We need to show that if a is weakly eﬃcient in A
and [ai = aj for all i,j ∈ N], then F(A)={a}.
Let a ∈ A be such that it is weakly eﬃcient and that [ai = aj for all
i,j ∈ N]. Consider the bargaining problem
B ≡ comp{a,(m1(A);a−1),···,(mi(A);a−i),···,(mn(A);a−n)}.
From the construction, B is symmetric and A ⊆ B.B y W e a k E ﬃciency
and Strong Symmetry, we must have F(B)={a}.N o t i n g t h a t A ⊆ B
and m(A)=m(B), by Weak Contraction Independence, we then obtain
F(A)={a}. Therefore, Theorem 3 is proved. ¦
To conclude this section, we make the following observations concern-
ing the logical independence of the axioms used in each of the above three
theorems.
Proposition 1: The axioms Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Invariance and
Contraction Independence are logically independent.
Proof. Consider the following solutions:
9(1) For all A ∈ Σ, F1(A)=A;
(2) For all A ∈ Σ, F2(A)={a ∈ A : a2
1
Qn
i=2 ai ≥ x2
1
Qn
i=2 xi for all x ∈ A};




i∈N xi for all x ∈ A};
(4) For all A ∈ Σ, F4(A)={a ∈ A : a is eﬃcient }.
It can be checked that F1 satisﬁes Symmetry, Scale Invariance and Con-
traction Independence while violates Eﬃciency; F2 satisﬁes Eﬃciency, Scale
Invariance and Contraction Independence while violates Symmetry; F3 satis-
ﬁes Eﬃciency, Symmetry and Contraction Independence while violates Scale
Invariance; and F4 satisﬁes Eﬃciency, Symmetry and Scale Invariance while
violates Contraction Independence. ¦
Proposition 2: The axioms, Weak Eﬃciency, Strong Symmetry and Con-
traction Independence are logically independent.
Proof. Consider the following solutions:
(5) For all A ∈ Σ, F5(A)={a ∈ A : ai = aj for all i,j ∈ N};
(6) For all A ∈ Σ,i fA is symmetric then F6(A) is given by the egalitarian
solution; otherwise, F6(A) is given by the Nash solution.
Clearly, F5 satisﬁes Strong Symmetry and Contraction Independence
while violates Weak Eﬃciency; the Nash solution satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency
and Contraction Independence while violates Strong Symmetry; and F6 sat-
isﬁes Weak Eﬃciency and Strong Symmetry while violates Contraction In-
dependence. ¦
Proposition 3: The axioms Weak Eﬃciency, Strong Symmetry, Scale In-
variance and Weak Contraction Independence are logically independent.
Proof. Consider the following solutions:
(7) For all A ∈ Σ, F7(A)={a ∈ A : ai/mi(A)=aj/mj(A)f o ra l li,j ∈ N};
(8) For all A ∈ Σ,i fA is such that mi(A)=mj(A)f o ra l li,j ∈ N,t h e n
F8(A) is given by the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; otherwise, F8(A)i s
given by {a ∈ A : a is weakly eﬃcient in A};
10(9) Let Σ∗ = {A ∈ Σ : mi(A)=mj(A)f o ra l li,j ∈ N}.D e ﬁne F9
as follows: for all A ∈ Σ∗,i fA is symmetric, then F9(A)i sg i v e n
by the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and if A is not symmetric, then
F9(A)={a ∈ A : a is weakly eﬃcient in A}; for all A ∈ Σ\Σ∗,F 9(A)=
{(a∗
i/αi)i∈N : a∗ ∈ F(A∗)} where A∗ = αA = {(αiai)i∈N : a ∈ A} for
some α ∈ Rn
++ such that A∗ ∈ Σ∗.
It can be checked that F7 satisﬁes Strong Symmetry, Scale Invariance and
Weak Contraction Independence while violates Weak Eﬃciency; the Nash
solution satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Scale Invariance and Contraction Indepen-
dence while violates Strong Symmetry; F8 satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Strong
Symmetry and Weak Contraction Independence while violates Scale Invari-
ance; and F9 satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Strong Symmetry and Scale Invariance
while violates Weak Contraction Independence. ¦
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have presented a uniﬁed framework to provide axiomatic
characterizations of the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions
for nonconvex bargaining problems. Our characterizations are simpler than
those existing in the literature. Our axioms are various natural general-
izations of the axioms used in Nash’s original discussion of the bargaining
problems for convex bargaining problems. The following table summarizes
our ﬁndings:
Table 1
Axioms\ Solutions NS ES KS
(E) ⊕ × ×
(WE) ° ⊕ ⊕
(S) ⊕ ° °
(SS) × ⊕ ⊕
(SI) ⊕ × ⊕
(CI) ⊕ ⊕ ×
(WCI) ° ° ⊕
where
11NS is for Nash Solution, ES for Egalitarian Solution, and KS for Kalai-
Smorodinsky Solution
⊕ stands for that the axiom is used for the characterization,
° stands for that the axiom is satisﬁed by the solution,
× stands for that the axiom is violated by the solution.
Clearly, Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry and Weak Contraction Independence
are satisﬁed by all three solutions. It is also clear that the Nash solution sat-
isﬁes all the axioms but Strong Symmetry, the egalitarian solution satisﬁes all
the axioms but Eﬃciency and Scale Invariance, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution satisﬁes all but Eﬃciency and Contraction Independence. Note that
Theorem 2 (resp. Theorem 3) constitutes a strengthening of the character-
ization of the egalitarian solution (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution)
by Conley and Wilkie (1991), since Contraction Independence (resp.W e a k
Contraction Independence) is logically implied by the monotonicity axiom
(resp.t h e weak monotonicity axiom) of Kalai (1977) in the presence of
Weak Eﬃciency.
It is also interesting to note that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution has
some constrained contraction property. It implies that once a partition of the
c l a s so fb a r g a i n i n gp r o b l e m si sd e ﬁned, where each equivalence class of this
partition consists of the bargaining problems with the same ideal point, then
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is rationalizable within each equivalence class
of the problems. This fact gives us some new insight on the rational choice
property of this solution, which the previous literature does not provide since
it is widely considered that it has no rational choice property.
It is hoped that our characterizations will shed some new lights on the
three solutions for nonconvex bargaining problems.
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